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Article 8

and development specialists than to individual churches
(although as the authors point out, some individual
churches have ventured into these areas). Nevertheless,
the strengths of this book greatly outstrip the minor areas

that could be improved. And the book is also timely, as
weakened North American and global economies make it
doubly important for individuals and organizations to be
both wise and stewardly as they seek to alleviate poverty.

Hunter, James Davison. To Change the World: The Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of Christianity in the
Late Modern World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 358 pages. ISBN: 978-0-19-973080-3.
Reviewed by Daniel Edward Young, Associate Professor of Political Science, Northwestern College (IA).
James Davison Hunter’s To Change the World is a
provocative book that everyone interested in the relationship
of Christianity and culture should read. A University of
Virginia sociologist of religion with a particular interest in
the “culture wars,” Hunter has an acute awareness of the
decreased cultural power of Christianity; as a Christian,
he seeks to rethink Christian cultural activity in a postChristian culture. Rejecting the dominant Christian view
on culture-changing, Hunter contends that “cultures are
profoundly resistant to intentional change—period” (45).
The dominant Christian view of culture, Hunter
contends, is that culture is that which is found in the hearts
and minds of individuals—so-called “values”: “By this
view, a culture is made up of the accumulation of values
held by the majority of people and the choices made on
the basis of those values” (6). According to this view,
changing culture requires changing hearts and minds, or the
worldview that shapes those hearts and minds; the choices
will then be different. He gives three subsequent beliefs of
this view: “First, real change must proceed individually—
one by one. …Second, cultural change can be willed into
being. …Third, cultural change is democratic—it occurs
from the bottom up” (16).
Hunter contends that this view of culture-changing
relies on “specious social science and problematic
theology” (5) and thus is “almost wholly mistaken” (17)
and bound to be ineffective in changing culture (32).
His contention is borne out by the fact that “in America
today, 86-88 percent of the people adhere to some faith
commitments. And yet our culture—business culture,
law and government, the academic world, popular
entertainment—is intensely materialistic and secular” (19).
How can this be true if culture is simply the accumulation
of values? In fact, culture often seems quite independent
of majority opinion (22). Hunter repeatedly says he does
not want to reject evangelism, political action, and social
reform movements; these are indeed good things. But, he
says that they do not change the culture (18).
Hunter contends that the dominant view goes awry
in its assuming that ideas move history and that conflicts
over culture are conflicts between worldviews (25). What
the predominant view fails to take into account is the
complexity of cultural production: culture is embedded
in, and is a product of, language, history, and institutions.
Culture exists where ideas, individuals, and institutions
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interact (34-35); cultural change flows from elite
institutions and impersonal forces such as the market, not
grassroots political action or individual action, and takes
place over a long period of time (42-43, 46). He explains
that Christians are largely “absent from the arenas in which
the greatest influence in the culture is exerted” (89): the
elite universities, the leading publishers, the leading venues
of the fine arts, and so forth. In fact, the church’s absence
from these areas is an indicator of the church’s lack of
health; it is not exercising itself in all areas of life (95). The
dominant view also involves the questionable assumption
that we can “know God’s specific plans in human history
and that one possesses the power to realize those plans in
human affairs” (95).
Law and a common culture are sources of social
solidarity, and, as Hunter notes, the one increases as
the other decreases; the proliferation of legislation and
litigation in recent decades is an indicator of the declining
commonality of our culture. The state, as promulgator and
adjudicator of law, is now seen as the locus of the public
weal, its reach touching on every aspect of life. The public
and the political are seen as coterminous (102-105). Hunter
worries about the politicization of modern society; that is,
all problems are seen as having a political solution, when in
fact no such thing is true (171). Hence, Christian cultural
engagement winds up being confined solely to political
activism with the intent of controlling and deploying
the coercive power of the state. Christian activism then
becomes functionally Nietzschean: all about the will to
power motivated by a ressentiment grounded in a perceived
victimization (107). Hunter describes three main American
Christian approaches to cultural engagement: the Christian
Right, the Christian Left, and the neo-Anabaptists, each
with their particular “myth and history” of contemporary
America. The Right and the Left seek to acquire political
power, while the neo-Anabaptists describe the church’s
witness, using the language of politics. In all three cases,
they fall victim to understanding modern society in terms
of politicization.
Given that we should reject the dominant and mistaken
view of cultural change, how should Christians seek change
in the late modern world of consumerism, democracy,
and technology? Hunter points out two major challenges
of the modern world: “difference” and “dissolution”;
these are aspects of modernity that Christians have not

adequately understood (199-200). Regarding difference, past
cultures lived in relative isolation, but today’s globalized
societies are constituted by cultural pluralism; in America
today, there is no dominant culture, and it is highly unlikely
there will be one. There is a fragmentation of worldviews
as well as social structures supporting the worldviews. The
other challenge, dissolution, relates to the deconstruction
of the most basic assumptions about reality; there is no
longer an assumption that words reliably refer to reality.
For example, Hunter does not think of today’s controversy
over whether the law ought to recognize certain same-sex
relationships as marriages. Essentially, the debate is over
to what state of affairs the term marriage refers; a hundred
years ago there would be no question of its referent. How
does one adjudicate the meaning of the term marriage
among multiple cultural discourses, each of which provides
an alternative context for understanding its meaning?
What shall we do then? Hunter’s central argument is
this:
God, then, does not speak through empty abstractions
or endless circumlocutions. Rather, in every instance,
God’s word was enacted and enacted in a particular
place and time in history. In all, presence and place mattered decisively. Nowhere is this more evident than the
incarnation.
Word and world, then, come together not so much
because words describe the world accurately or because
words correspond to reality. Rather, word and world
come together through the word’s enactments—both the
fact that God’s word is always enacted but also in the way
his word is enacted.
This, in short, is the foundation of a theology of faithful
presence. It can be summarized in two essential lessons
for our time. The first is that incarnation is the only adequate
reply to the challenges of dissolution; the erosion of trust between
word and world and the problems that attend it. From this
follows the second: it is the way the Word became incarnate in
Jesus Christ and the purposes to which the incarnation was directed
that are the only adequate reply to the challenge of difference. For
the Christian, if there is a possibility for human flourishing in a world such as ours, it begins when God’s word
of love becomes flesh in us, is embodied in us, is enacted
through us and in doing so, a trust is forged between the
word spoken and the reality to which it speaks; to the
words we speak and the realities to which we, the church,
point. In all, presence and place matter decisively. (240241; italics in original)

Hunter believes that American Christians today have
much faith but have been formed by the larger postChristian culture of modernity, which increasingly does
not resemble the biblical vision of human flourishing:
shalom. In response, the church, in both its local and
universal manifestations, must embody this shalom (227).

Hunter suggests that Christians relate to the world through
a twofold dialectic of “affirmation” and “antithesis”; the
Christian affirms that which is good in the world, while
refusing that which is not (231). “Faithful presence” is
Hunter’s term for the church’s critical but constructive
resistance to the institutions of late modernity:
In our present historical circumstances, this means
that the church and its people must stand in a position
of critical resistance to late modernity and its institutions and carriers; institutions like modern capitalism,
liberalism, social theory, health care, urban planning,
architecture, art, moral formation, family, and so on.
But here again, let me emphasize that antithesis is not
simply negational. Subversion is not nihilistic but creative
and constructive. Thus the church—as a community,
within individual vocations, and through both existing
and alternative social institutions—stands antithetical to
modernity and its dominant institutions in order to offer
an alternative vision or direction for them. Antithesis,
then, does not require a stance that is antimodern or
premodern but rather a commitment to the modern
world in that it envisions it differently. Such a task begins
with a critical assessment of the metaphysical, epistemological, and anthropological assumptions that undergird
modern institutions and ideologies. But the objective is
to retrieve the good to which modern institutions and assumptions implicitly or explicitly aspire; to oppose those
ideals and structures that undermine human flourishing,
and to offer constructive alternatives for the realization
of a better way. (235-6)

What does this look like concretely? Hunter gives
examples such as the following (266-269):
• An automotive company that asked itself “what do
we owe our customers and employees?” and as a result lowered prices at its inner city dealerships as well
as creating a college tuition fund for children of all
employees.
• A Washington, D.C., art gallery that believed that
“people with the greatest need had the greatest need
for beauty” and sponsored an art exhibit which featured DC artists’ paintings and sculptures about an
impoverished and crime-ridden section of the city.
• A music, film, and culture magazine that avoided the
focus on “artistic and moral squalor” often featured
in the popular culture press and “celebrated musical
quality and promoted cultural products that ennobled
the human spirit.”

Hunter concludes by contending that the paradigm
of faithful presence is the exiled Jews in Babylon, who are
counseled to seek that city’s peace (276ff).
Hunter’s approach to Christian cultural engagement
is broadly Reformed, using concepts such as the cultural
mandate, common grace (affirmation)/antithesis, and a creationfall-redemption motif. However, given his account of cultural
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change, he is very skeptical of the language of “redeeming
culture.” Essentially, Hunter promulgates what might be
called “Niebuhrian neo-Calvinism.” While mentioned only
in passing, the ghost of Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971)
looms on these pages, intentionally or not. One reason for
Niebuhr’s enduring appeal (President Obama cites him as a
favorite) is his emphasis on the limitations of politics. For
Niebuhr, politics can only be ameliorative, not redemptive.
This idea had particular resonance in the mid-twentieth
century as the Western democracies faced messianic
ideologies such as communism that sought to wholly
reshape societies and even human nature itself. While
today we do not face totalitarian messianism, there is still
the temptation to see politics as the solution to everything;
it is this politicization of modern society that Hunter
bemoans. Niebuhr also emphasized the inescapability of
power in political and social life. Of course the words
irony and tragedy found in the subtitle are very Niebuhrian.
What is not particularly Niebuhrian is the note of critical
resistance to the late modern world.
There is much to commend in this volume. The book
is accessible to a non-specialist audience and would be
excellent for college courses or church discussion groups.
It is a very good orientation to the key approaches of
Christian cultural engagement found in America today.
Nevertheless, I was left with some questions. Hunter
defines power as “coercion or the threat thereof ” (101), yet
later in the book he refers to Jesus’ non-coercive power,
which we are to imitate (191, 247). How these are to be
reconciled is not made clear. Elsewhere, in passing, he
seems to say that the concept of power is useless (256).
However, Hunter contends that our imitation of Christ
does not translate into pacifism. Power must be wielded.
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Coercion is inevitable on some occasions as the lesser of
two evils, but it cannot be considered as bringing about the
kingdom of God (192-193). Hunter is wary about salvific
or redemptive ideas of “building the kingdom of God”
(233) since working within institutions to achieve a goal
means the use of power, which is potentially corrupting.
Yet his idea of faithful presence uses terms such as
“foretaste” of the kingdom. Why is a foretaste, but not
building, acceptable? Elsewhere, he says faithful presence
is transformative of culture (253, 269). Hunter does not
make clear how this notion of transformation fits with his
earlier statement that “cultures are profoundly resistant to
intentional change—period.”
Another difficulty is that Hunter seems to overestimate
the amount of common ground that Christians have with
non-Christians. For example, Hunter states that politics
ought to be pursued in the light of the justice of God
(253) and that we ought to try to create conditions in social
structures that are conducive to the flourishing of all (247).
Yet what the justice of God is and what human flourishing
looks like are controversial, even among Christians, not to
mention those who are not Christians or those who are
atheists.
Overall, I am not clear on whether Hunter offers
a genuinely alternative vision for Christian cultural
engagement or simply a more modest one. My questions
aside, Hunter’s book is an excellent entry into the “Christ
and culture” genre. Hunter’s warning against simplistic
conceptions of culture-changing is welcome and ought to
prompt Christians to the careful study of power structures
and cultural production. To Change the World is a book that
all Christians ought to read.

